Read:A Failure of Initiative: The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Read Command and Control Chapter p. 183-200): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109hrpt377/pdf/CRPT-109hrpt377.pdfCourse Resources: eReserves: Bigley, G. A., & Roberts, K. H. (2001). The Incident Command System: High-Reliability Organizing for Complex and Volatile Task Environments. Academy of Management Journal, 44(6), 1281–1300.Course Resources: eReserves: Buck, D. A., Trainor, J. E., and Aguirre, B. E. (2006). A critical evaluation of the Incident Command System and NIMS, Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 3, 1–27.Renaud, C. (2012, June). The Missing Piece of NIMS: Teaching Incident Commanders How to Function in the Edge of Chaos, Homeland Security Affairs, 8, 8. http://www.hsaj.org/?article=8.1.8Course Resources: eReserves: Neal, D., & Webb, G. (2006). Structural barriers to using the national incident management system in Natural Hazards Center (Ed.) Learning from catastrophe: Quick response research in the wake of Hurricane Katrina (pp. 263–282). Natural Hazards Center (Ed.), Boulder, Colorado: University of Colorado.Answer:Read the article by Bigley and Roberts (2001). They identify four structural mechanisms of the ICS that lead to reliability in volatile environments. Describe each of these mechanisms. Based on your specific knowledge from reading about Hurricane Katrina, analyze one of these mechanisms and describe if it was successfully employed, failed, or was not implemented?
